PRESIDENT THOUGHT SHANTUNG SETTLEMENT BEST HE COULD GET

isid you. I can only reply from my own knowledge came showledge and my own knowledge came ster I reached Paris.

Senator Borah—When did the secret treaties?

Senator Borah—When did the secret treaties of course of the course of the principal Allied and Associated Powers; but the four who used to confer, or rather the five, because Japan was there, of course, at that time.

Senator McCumber—The principal points were taken down in writing and read over and compared and preserved, were they?

The President—Yes, the whole series of the principal points were taken down in writing and read over and compared and preserved, were they?

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The President—Since I knew nothing of them, necessarily not.

Senator Johnson—Did China enter the war upon our advice—the advice of the United States?

China's Entrance Into War.

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"Senator Johnson—Would the Japan was there, or rather the five, because I really have not the facts on which to form an opinion of them, necessarily not.

Senator Johnson—Would the Japan was there, or rather the five, because I really have not the facts of the land of the principal points were taken down in writing and the facts of the facts of the land of the principal points were taken down in writing and the facts of the

of understandings were disclosed to me

you reached Paris?
The President—Not unless there was on at the State Department of which I know nothing.

senator Borah—Do you know when these secret treaties between Japan, Great Britain and other countries were arst made known to Chinh?

Tells of First Suggestion.

The President—No, sir: I do not. I remember a meeting of what was popuramember a meeting of Ten, after our ng Paris, in which it was first sughould be laid upon the table of the con-That was some time after we there, and I do not know thether that was China's first knowl-

edge of these matters or not.

Senator Borah—Would it be proper for me to ask if Great Britain and France insisted upon maintaining these secret treatles at the Peace Conference

The President-I think it is proper for mawer that question, sir put it in this way: They felt that they could not recede from them, that is to any that they were bound by them, but when they involved general interests they were quite willing, and indeed I thing outside? (If I go too far with my questions you can signify it, Mr. President.) parties. I mean with the consent so far as they were concerned of the other

Senator Swanson-Can you tell us, or would it be proper to do so, of your understanding with Japan as to the turn of Shantung—a question which has been very much discussed?

tioned.

The President—I have published the wording of the understanding, Senator, I cannot be confident that I quote it iterally, but I know that I quote it it substance. It was, that Japan should tream to China in full sovereignty the return to China in full sovereignty the Shantung so far as the world mean that the process should the second old province of Shantung so far as dermany had had any claims upon it, preserving to herself the right to establish a residential district at Taingtao, which is the town of Kiachow Bay that with regard to the railways and she should retain only the rights Japan reserves is the same that other economic concession there, with great nations have reserved—certain conan economic concession there, with a right, however, to maintain a spethe right, however, to maintain a special body of police on the railway, the under Japanese instructors nominated by the managers of the company and appointed by the Chinese Government.

Senator' McCumber — The same as Great Britain and France and other countries have retained there? think that is the whole of it. Senator Borah-Was that understand-

ag oral?
The President—Senator Borah asked The President—Senator Borah asset the dealings of other nations whether this understanding was oral the dealings of other nations whether this understanding was oral the dealings of other nations whether this understanding was oral the dealings of other nations whether this understanding was oral the dealings of other nations whether this understanding was oral the dealings of other nations whether this understanding was oral the dealings of other nations whether this understanding was oral the dealings of other nations.

Senator Johnson (Cal.)-When, Mr. Senator Johnson (Cal.)—When, Mr. President, is the return to be made?

The President—That was left undecided, Senator, but we were assured at the time that it would be as soon as

Senator Johnson-Did not the Japanese decline to fix any date?

Could Not Fix a Date. The President-They did at that time.

yes; but I think it is fair to them to just as sh say, not in the spirit of those who situation? wished it to be within their choice, but The Pre

fair mastery over the province, they not, or at least the Chinese Let me put it in that fashion,

The President-Well, Senator, I hope on will pardon me if I do not answer

Senator Pall-Mr. President, speaking

of the duty of defence in reference to descriptly, and of aggression with ref-dence to sovereignty, in construing these different articles of the league. I have been curious to know who will defend the mandate territories or col-tales if there should be external aggres-The President-Primarily, the man-

Senator Fail—The mandatory power the war?

Senator Fail—The mandatory power the war?

The President—No; not so far us I know.

Senator Johnson—Could you state Senator Fall-Then a qualified sover-

eignty would, in that instance at any rate, compel the mandatory of the league first to defend the colony? President-d should put it this way, Senator: We had in mind throughidea the analogy of trustees. The stes taking those under mandates fuld he in the nature of trustees, and, course, it is part of the trustees' duty

Benzor Fall—But out of the funds of trust estate?

The President—Oh, yes.
Senator Fall—Mr. President, J will
t pursue that line at this time. I will very frankly that I have prepared duestions which I wanted, for my drposes, to put down in writing, had expected to ask them in e of you after the other Senators actuded. It will, however, evincluded. It will, however, evithe line which we are now purand particularly if the Senators of the different clauses in the

The President-Not read over and of understandings were disclosed to me
for the first time then.

Senator Borah—Then we had no
gnowledge of these secret treaties so far
as our Government was concerned until proces verbal, copies of which were dis tributed within twenty-four hours, and of course it was open to any one of the conferees to correct anything they might contain. Only in that sense were they corrected. Senator McCumber-Where are those

records kept now? The President—They are in Paris, sir. Senator McCumber—Is there any objection to their being produced for the

The President-I think there is a very The President—I think there is a very serious objection. Senator. The reason we constituted that very small confer-ence was that we could speak with the utmost absence of restraint, and I think it would be a mistake to make use of those discussions outside. I do not re-

member any biazing indiscretion of my own, but there may be some. Senator-McCumber—In those conver-sations it was fully understood that Japan was to return Shantung as soon as

The President-Yes, sir. Senator McCumber—Was there anything stated as to what was meant by "as soon as possible"—that is, to place it within any definite period at all?

The President—No, sir: no. We relied

they involved general interests on Japan's good faith in fulfilling that as they realized were involved, were quite willing, and indeed I . Senator McCumber—Was there any-

The President-How do you mean outside, Senator? Senator McCumber-Was there any-thing said by Japan as to anything that she would want to do before she turned

the territory over to China?

The President—No, nothing was men

it would mean that the process should

begin then. Of course, there would be many practical considerations of which I know nothing that might prolong the Senator McCumber-And all tha

The President-A residential concesof which should be Chinese sion and economic concessions; yes, sir.

countries have retained there?

The President—Yes; and I ought to say that the representatives of Japan showed every evidence of wishing to put the matter upon just the same basis that the dealings of other nations with China

sechnically oral, but literally written and formulated, and the formulation agreed will in good faith carry out her agree-The President-I have every confidence that she will, sir.

Senator Pomerene—Mr. President, if I may, I should like to ask a question or two along that same line. If this treaty should fall of ratification then could not the opportunity be open to Japan to treat the Shantung question just as she has treated the Manchurian

The President-I think so; yes. simply that they could not at that time
say when it would be.
Senator Johnson—The economic privleges that they would retain would give be practically at the mercy of Japan,
when a fair mastery over the province, whereas if the treaty is ratified then at
avoid they not, or at least the Chippen least she will have the benefit of the moral assistance of all the other signaleast she will have

tory Powers to the treaty to aid in the The President—I believe they do, should say that that was an exagshould say that the should sa serated view.

Senator Johnson—But the Chinese feel Nations to be just what you have indicated your have indicated themselves?

The President—They have so expressed themselves.

Benator Knox—Mr. President, the economic privileges that they originally action of the world on all relationships of that hazardous sort, particularly those relationships which involve the rights of the weaker nations. After all, the wars that are likely to come are most likely to come by aggression against the weaker nations. Without prover those countries; have they not the League of Nations to be just what you have indicated; that it would bring to bear the opinion of the world and the controlling action of the world on all relationships which involve the rights of the weaker nations. After all, the wars that are likely to come by aggression against the weaker nations. Without the wars that are likely to come by aggression against the weaker nations. Without the wars that are likely to come by aggression against the weaker nations. After all, the wars that are likely to come by aggression against the weaker nations. Without the wars that are likely to come by aggression against the weaker nations. After all, the wars that are likely to come by aggression against the weaker nations. After all, the wars that are likely to come by aggression against the weaker nations. After all, the wars that are likely to come by aggression against the weaker nations. After all, the wars that are likely to come by aggression against the weaker nations. After all, the wars that are likely to come by aggression against the weaker nations. After all, the wars that are likely to come by aggression against the weaker nations. After all, the wars that are likely to come against the weaker nations. After all, the wars that are likely to come against the weaker nations.

The President—Yes, Senator, in the sheenes of a League of Nations they have.

Senator Knox—You think the League of Nations would have prevented that do you?

The President—I am confident it would, Senator New—Mr. President does not this indefinite promise of Japan's suggest the somewhat analogous case of Lagland's occupation of Maita? She has eccupied Maita for something like a century. I believe, under a very similar promise.

The President—Well, Senator, I hope

gize in advance for asking them and itrust you will stop me at once if they are questions which you deem inappropriate or that ought not to be asked.

The President—Thank you.

Senator Johnson—I think the question I am about to ask you answered to Senator Borah, so pardon me if it is repetitive. The question is, Was the

Senstor Borah, so pardon me if it is repetitive. The question is. Was the United States Government officially informed at any time between the rupture of diplomatic relations with Germany and the signing of the armistice of agreements made by the allied Governments in regard to the settlement of the war?

The President—No: not so far us I

The President-No; not so far us I whether or not any official investigation was made by our Government to ascertain whether or not there were any such treaties of territorial dispositio? The President-There was no such in-

Vestigation.

Senator Johnson—These specific treaties, then the treaty of London, on the basis of which Italy entered the war, the agreement with Rumania, in August, 1916, the various agreements in respect to Asia Minor and the agreements consummated in the winter of 1917 between France and Russia relative to the frontiers of Germany, and particularly in relation to the Saar Valsasked Secretary Lansing: (Reading) tive to the frontiers of Germany, and particularly in relation to the Saar Valley and the left bank of the Rhine, none of these did we have, and when I say "we" I mean you, Mr. President, any knowledge of prior to the conference at Paris.

The President—Sir, I can confidently answer that question "no" in regard to

answer that question "no" in regard to Senator McCumber Senator Johnson,

may I ask the President right here whether or not any treaties were made after we entered into the war between any of our cobelligerents that were not given to us.

The President—No, sir. I do not

The President—No.

Senator McCumber—Mr. President. 1
Senator McCumber—Mr. President. 1
Senator McCumber—Mr. President. 1
Mnow of any.

Senator Johnson—When our Government. through you. Mr. President, in January, 1918. made the fourteen points as the basis for peace, were those points made with the knowledge of the existence of the secret agreements?

The President—They are evidenced in a process verbal of the so-called Council.

Senator Johnson—It was not intended, then, by the expression of those

The President—I cannot tell, sir, We dvised her to enter and she soon after did. Whether she had sought our advice, and whether that was the per-suasive advice or not, I do not know. Senator Johnson—Do you recall, Mr President, that preceding that advice we had asked China, as one of the neu tral nations, to sever diplomatic rela-tions with Germany? The President-Whether we had asked

Senator Johnson—Yes, sir.

The President—I do not recall, Senator. I am sure Mr. Lansing can tell though from the records of the department.

Senator Johnson-Do you know, Mr President, whether or not our Govern-ment stated to China that if China would enter the war we would protect

her interests at the Peace Conference?
The President—We made no promises.
Senator Johnson—No representations of that sort?

The President-No: she knew that w would do as well as we could. She had very reason to know that. Senator Johnson-Pardon me a fur ther question; you did make the attempt do it too, did you not? The President—Oh, indeed I did, very

Senator Johnson—And the decision ultimately reached at the Peace Conference was a disappointment to you?

The President-Yes, sir; I may frank say that it was. Senator Johnson—You would have preferred, as I think most of us would, that there had been a different conclu-sion of the Shantung provision, or the Shantung difficulty or controversy, at

the Paris Peace Conference President-Yes; I frankly inti-

unanimous consent of the members of the Peace Conference to reach a de-cision like the Shantung decision. The President—Every decision, yes, Senator Johnson—Do you recall, Mr. President, prior to the decision on the territorial question of Shantung, or of

German rights in Shantung, the racial equality question coming before the Peace Conference?

The President—I remember at one of the sessions, called plenary sessions, a resolution regarding that matter was introduced by the Japanese representa-

tives, but rather as an expression of opinion, or hope, and it was not pressed press at that time stated that it had gone to a vote, and I trust some one will correct me if I am in error, and that the vote was 11 to 6 on the propo sition. The despatches at that time were

to that effect. The President—I was misled, Senator. You are referring to the commission on a League of Nations? Senator Johnson-Yes.

Wilson Silent on Shantung.

The President-There was a vote there There never was a vote on any subject in the peace conference. Senator Johnson-I confounded the

The President—Senator, I think it is very natural you should ask that. I am not sure that I am at liberty to answer, because that touches the intimady of a great many controversies that oc-curred in that conference and I think it is best, in the interest of international good understanding, that I should not

Senator Johnson-Do you know, Mr. President, whether or not the American Commission at Paris urged that a definite sum of reparation be fixed in the

treaty

The President-It did.

may create at misapprehension on your part. Let me see if I can explain it, without indiscretion: I would be very glad, gentlemen, to tell you all about it if you will leave it out of the notes.

May I do that?—because I do not wish to leave any worse impression. May I do that?—because I do not wish to leave any wrong impression on your submit a question of arbitration and minds. The explanation is perfectly agree that the decision shall be final.

structed not to sign in that event (the refusal to award Shantung to Japan.) Senator Johnson-Was the decision reached, if you will pardon the per-fectly blunt question, because Japan

reached in that way?
The President—No. I do not think would be true to say "Yes" to that question. It was reached because we thought it was the best that could be got, in view of the definite engagements of Great Britain and France, and the necessity of a unanimous decision, which Senator Johnson-Great Britain and question.

Best of Poor Bargain.

Senator Johnson-Do you mind stating, or would you prefer not, what it by Japan? The President-Only the conclusion

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nese signature to the League of Na-tions have been obtained if you had not

made the Shantung agreement?
"Secretary Lansing—I think so,
"Senator Johnson—You do?
"Secretary Lansing—I think so. "Senator Johnson—So that even though Shantung had not been delivered to Japan, the League of Nations would

not have been injured? "Secretary Lansing—I do not think so.
"Senator Johnson—And you would have had the same signatories that you ment:

Secretary Lansing-Yes, one more-China. "Senator Johnson—One more—China. So that the result of the Shantung de-cision was simply to lose China's signature rather than to gain Japan's?
"Secretary Lansing—No, that is my
personal view, but I may be wrong

"Senator Johnson-Why did you yield on a question on which you thought you ought not to yield and that you

thought was a principle?
"Secretary Lansing—Because natu rally we were subject to the direction of the President of the United States. "Senator Johnso -And it was solel "Senator Johnson—And it was solel because you felt that you were sub ject to the decision of the President of the United States that you yielded?
"Secretary Lansing—Yes,
"Senator Johnson—The decision is

"Secretary Lansing-Necessarily." Now I wondered whether Secret Lansing was well informed about this question or not?

Lansing View Contradicted. The President-Well, my conclusion

is different from his, sir, sented that.

Senator Johnson—Did it require the have got the signature of Japan if you had not given Japan Shantung. The President-That is my judgment Senator Brandegee-You say you were

> The President-Yes, sir. Senator Swanson-As I understand you were notified that they had instruc-tions not to sign unless this was in-

The President—Yes. Senator Borah—And was it your judg ment that after the treaty had been ratified. China's rights would be pro-tected and Japan would surrender to China what she said she would?

The President-Yes. Senator Swanson—As I understand you consider this verbal agreement.ef fective as relating to Shantung, and you understood that this conveyance would be followed by a conveyance to

The President-Not to supersede 1 but the action by Japan is to follow Senator Johnson — Yes. But. Mr President, you would have much pre-ferred to have a different disposition, notwithstanding the promise of Japan

in the treaty, would you not?
The Fresident—Yes, sir.
Senator Brandegee—Under Article X
the members of the league undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integ-rity and existing political independence of all members of the league. That Senator Johnson—May I ask, if permissible how the representatives of the United States voted upon that particular proposition?

The President—Yes.

of all members of the league. The is a contract between the signatories We say, "we undertake to preserve the territorial integrity of the members proposition?

The President—Yes.

The President-We engage to do it. Senator Brandegee-It means an in-ernational contract, does it not, a com-

pact, an agreement The President-Yes. Senator Brandegee-Whether that is

The President-Yes International Promise Bared.

Senator Brandegee-Of course it is noral duty to keep a promise, and this is an international promise, so that the Senator Johnson-Will you state, if and a legal one seems to me to be not o

The judgment of one of the parties to simple.

(The subject subsequently was dropped.)

Senator Johnson—May I ask one or two more questions concerning Shantung, which I omitted or forgot?

The President—Certainly, Senator, Senator Johnson—First: Did Japan decline to sign the award as made or proyided in the peace treaty?

The President—Her representatives informed us, Senator, that they were instructed not to sign in that event (the

FIND FRENCH TREATY IS CONSTITUTIONAL Seclined to sign unless that decision was Judiciary Senators to Report

in Favor of Alliance. treaty by which the United States would go to the aid of France in event of an

conflict with the Constitution, in the opinion of the Senate Judiciary subnmittee appointed to consider the Senator Fall (N. M.) was absent at-

tending the White House conference, but the opinion of the remainder of the submmittee was unanimous. members are Nelson Minn.), Kellogg (Minn.), Republicans; Overman (N. C.). Walsh (Mont.), Democrats. Chairman Nelson will prepare a report for sub-mission to the full committee Monday. was that caused you ultimately to acceed to the decision that was demanded France and Great Britain.

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tances today. we have brought them together, however, for a short while: a large variety of textures - guaranteed all wool-ultra-smart styles-1350 until 2 pm Saturday. Cordially w= morgan

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TEXT OF WILSON'S APPEAL FOR SPEEDY RATIFICATION

Opposes Amendment Which Would Give Germans a Chance to Quibble and Other Nations Cue to Revise Treaty Terms.

Special Despatch to THE SUN. WASHINGTON, Aug. 19 .- At the opening of the conference between President Wilson and the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate in the White House to-day, the President read the following state-

Mr. Chairman: i am sincerely glad that the committee should have responded in this way to my intimation that I would like to be of service to it. I welcome opportunity for a frank and full interchange of views.

I hope, too, that this conference will serve to expedite your consideration of the treaty of peace, I beg that you will par-don and indulge me if I again urge that practically the whole task of bringing the country back to normal conditions of life and industry waits upon the decisio of the Senate with regard to the terms of the peace.

I venture thus again to urge my advice that the action of the Senate with regard to the treaty be taken at the earliest practicable moment because the problems with which we are face to face in the readjustment of our national life are of the most pressing and critiical character, will require for their proper solution the most intimate and disinterested cooperation of all parties and all interests and cannot be postponed without manifest peril to our people and to all the national advantages we hold most dear. May I mention a few of the matters which cannot handled with intelligence until the country knows the character of the peace it is to have? I do

so only by a very few samples War When There Is No War. The copper mines of Montana, Arizona and Alaska, for example are being kept open and in operation only at a great cost and loss, in part upon borrowed money; the zinc mines of Missouri, Tennesse and Wisconsin are being operated about one-half their capacity; the lead of Idaho, Illinois and Missouri reaches only a portion of its former market: there is an immediate need for cotton belting, and also for lubricating oil which can-not be met—all because the channels of trade are barred by war when there is no war. The same is true of raw cotton, of which the Central Empires alone formerly

purchased nearly 4,000,000 bales. And these are only examples. There is hardly a single raw material, a single imported foodstuff or a single class of manufactured goods which is not in the

same case. Our full normal profitable production waits on peace.

Military Plans Wait on Peace. Our military plans of course wait upon it. We cannot intelligently or wisely decide how large a naval or military force we shall maintain or what our policy with regard to military training is be until we have peace not only. but also until we know how peace is to be sustained, whether by the arms of single nations or by the concert of all the great peoples And there is more than that difficulty involved. The vast surplus properties of the army include not food and clothing merely, whose sale will affect normal productions, but great manufacturing establishments also which should be restored to their former uses, great stores of machine tools, and all sorts of merchandise which must lie idle until peace and milimined. By the same token there

can be no properly studied national budget until then. The nations that ratify the treaty, such as Great Britain, Belgium and France, will be in a position to lay their plans for controlling the markets of Central Europe, without competition from us, if we do not presently act. We have no consular agents, no trade representatives there to

look after our interests. Europe Looks for Peace. There are large areas of Europe

whose future will lie uncertain and questionable until their people know the final settlements of peace and the forces which are to administer and sustain it. Without determinate markets our production cannot proceed with intelligence or confidence. can be no stabilization of wage because there can be no settled condition of employment. can be no easy or normal industrial credits because there can b no confident or permanent revival

But I will not weary you with obvious examples. I will only venture to repeat that every element of normal life among us depends upon and awaits the ratification of the treaty of peace; and also that we cannot afford to lose a single summer's day by not doing all that we can to mitigate the winter's sufferings, which, unless we find means to prevent it, may prove disastrous to a large portion of the world, and thay, at its werst, bring upon Europe conditions even more terrible than those

wrought by the war itself.

Defends the Covenant. Nothing, I am led to believe stands in the way of the ratification of the treaty except certain doubts with regard to the meaning and implication of certain articles of the covenant of the League of Nations; and I must frankly say that I am unable to understand why such doubts should be entertained. You will recall that when I had the pleasure of a conference with your committee and with the Com mittee of the House of Representtatives on Foreign Affairs at the White House in March last the question now most frequently asked about the League of Nations were all canvassed, with a view to their immediate clarification. The covenant of the league was then in its first draft and subject to revision. It was pointed out that no express recognition was given to the Monroe Doctrine, that it was not expressly provided that the league should have no authority to act or to express judgment on matters of domestic policy, that the right to withdraw from the league was not expressly recognized; and that the constitutional right of the Congress to determine all questions of peace and war was not sufficiently Paris all these matters were taken up again by the Commision on the

League of Nations and every suggestion of the United States was

America's View Accepted. The view of the United States with regard to the questions I have mentioned had, in fact, already been accepted by the commission, and there was supposed to be nothing inconsistent with them in the draft of the covenant first adopted, the draft which was the subject of our discussion in March, but no objection was made to saying explicitly in the text what all had supposed to be implicit in it. There was absolutely no doubt as to the meaning of any one of the resulting provisions of the covenant in the minds of those who participated in drafting them, and I respectfully submit that there is nothing vague or doubtful

in their wording.

The Monroe Doctrine is expressly mentioned as an understanding which is in no way to be impaired or interfered with by anything contained in the covenant, and the expression "regional understand ings like the Monroe Doctrine" was used, not because any one of the conferees thought there was any comparable agreement anywhere else in existence or in contemplation, but only because it was thought best to avoid the appearance of dealing in such a document with the policy of a single nation. Absolutely nothing is concealed in the phrase.

With regard to domestic questions. Article XVI, of the covenant expressly provides that if in case of any dispute arising be-

tween members of the league the of the parties. "and is found by the Council to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its settle

ment." Domestic Questions Safeguarded.

The United States was by no means the only Government interested in the explicit adoption of this provision, and there is no doubt in the mind of any authoritative student of international law that such matters as immigration, tariffs and naturalization are incontestably domestic ques tions with which no international body could deal without express authority to do so.

No enumeration of domestic questions was undertaken, be cause to undertake it, even by ample, would have involved the danger of seeming to exclude those not mentioned.

The right of any sovereign State to withdraw had been taken for granted, but no objection was made to making it explicit; indeed, so soon as the views ex-pressed at the White House conference were laid before the commission it was at once conceded answer to so important a question

to inference. No proposal was made to set up any tribunal to pass judgment upon the question whether a withdrawing nation had in fact fulfilled 'all its international obligations and all its obligations under the covenant." It was rec ognized that that question must be left to be resolved by the con-science of the nation proposing to withdraw, and I must say that it did not seem to me worth while to propose that the article be more explicit, · because I knew that the United States would never itself propose to withdraw from the league if its conscience was not entirely clear as to the fulfilment of all its international obligations. never failed to fulfil them and

Council Can Only "Advise." Article X, is in no respect of doubtful meaning when read in the light of the covenant as a whole. The Council of the league can only "advise upon" the means by which the obligations of that great article are to be given effect to. Unless the United States is a party to the policy or action in question her own affirmative vote in the Council is necessary before any advice can be given, for a unanimous vote of the Council is required. If she is a party, the trouble is hers anyhow the unanimous vote of the Coun-

cil is only advice in any case Each Government is free to reject it as it pleases. Nothing could have been made more clear to the conference than the right of our Congress, under our Constitution, to exercise its independent judgment in all matters of peace and war. No attempt was

made to question or limit that right. The United States will, indeed, undertake, under Article X., to respect and preserve, as against external aggression, the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the league, and that engagement constitutes a very grave and solemn moral obligation. moral, not a legal, obligation, and leaves our Congress absolutely free to put its own interpretation upon it in all cases that call for action. It is binding in conscience only, not in law.

tute the very backbone of the whole covenant. Without it the league would be hardly more than an influential debating society No Objections to Interpretations. It has several times been suggested in public debate and in pri-

vate conference, that interpreta-

Article X. seems to me to consti-

tions of the sense in which the United States accepts the engagements of the covenant should be embodied in the instrument of ratification. There can be no reasonable objection to such interpretations accompanying the act of ratification provided they do not form a part of the formal

ratification itself. Most of the interpretations which have been suggested to me embody what seems to me the plain meaning of the instrument itself. But if such interpretations should constitute a part of the formal resolution of ratification. long delays would be the inevitable consequence, inasmuch as all the many Governments concerned would have to accept, in effect, the language of the Senate as the language of the treaty before ratifica-

tion would be complete. The assent of the German Assembly at Weimar would have to be obtained, among the rest, and I must frankly say that I could only with the greatest reluctance approach that assembly for permission to read the treaty as understand it and as those who framed it quite certainly understood it.

Would Cloud Whole Trenty.

If the United States were to qualify the document in any way, moreover, I am confident from what I know of the many conferences and debates which accompanied the formulation of the treaty that our example would immediately be followed in many quarters, in some instances with very serious reservations, and that the meaning and operative force of the treaty would presently be clouded from one end of

its clauses to the other. Pardon me, Mr. Chairman, if I have been entirely unreserved and plain spoken in speaking of the great matters we all have so much at heart. If excuse is needed, I trust that the critical situation of affairs may serve as my justifica-

The tesues that manifestly hang upon the conclusions of the Senate with regard to peace and upon the time of its action are so grave and so clearly insusceptible of being thrust on one side or postponed that I have felt it necessary in the public interest to make this urgent plea, and to make it as simply and as unre-

servedly as possible. The appointment of William R. Larkin, overseas director of the Knights of Columbus, as a Knight Commander of the Order of St. Gregory, was confirmed a yesterday by the receipt of a bull addressed by Pope Benedict XV, to Archbishop Hayes, which bere the signature of Cardinal Gasparri, Papal Secretary of



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bank. This is a matter of economy in time and therefore a saving in money, but the other factors combined are of greater importance, possibly nothing more so than the personality behind the bank. After that, the special service that the bank may be able to render, and in this connection it is worth while to say that a bank that has no special and particular feature of service has really no reason for existence. The chemical composition of the human body may

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